OPINIO PRUDENTUM IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW.
Throughout this article the word "opinio" will be used to
denote oral opinion only. In its larger sense opinion would
certainly include also views expressed in writing. Strict Romanists, we are aware, may take us to task for using the expression
"opinio prudentum" in this limited meaning. Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this article, we will discard the classic significance of the cited sentence and will adopt the medkeval use of the
word following the footsteps of Sir Edward Coke. 1
A further limitation on the scope of our subject is that it
is confined to the opinion of native jurisprudentes on any doctrine of Anglo-American law. Therefore, opinions of experts,
both domestic and foreign on the customs or the opinion of
ioreign lawyers as to the foreign law are excluded from our
review. Of course, the opinion here considered is that of the
persons skilled in law-juris periti. Under separate headings
we will discuss consecutively general opinion of the Bar, legal
academic opinion and individual professional opinion.
GENERAL PROFESSIONAL OPINION.

There is not a slightest doubt that early, that is, about the
ieign of Edward I, the general or universal opinion of the
Bar, e. g., the persons forming the legal profession of the country,
was often solicited by the judges and regarded, when obtained,
as of authority. Unfortunately, we cannot go back earlier than
30 Ed. I or the beginning of the fourteenth century. In the year
1302 we have a report that: "Pus per dirent lor bref par non
sute pur se que par touz les serjaunzle bref ne fut pas nmeyntenable en le cas." 2 The next instance of such a reference to
the opinions of the Bar we find in Edward II's time, eight years
later: "And this was the opinion of Herle and, for the greater
part, of all the Serjeants except Passeley, who told Hedon
boldly to stick to his point.

And so he did

.

'Co. Litt. Y86a.
2Robert v. Jon, (13O2) Y. B. 30 Ed. I. (R. S.) Io5.
(340)

.

.

Then (et
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tunc) said Beresford, C. J.: 'I wish all of you to understand
that no writ of entry is a writ of right, but it lies in the possession coloured by right, for that is a writ of right which takes
issue in the right.' "3 We think that "et tunc" makes it sufficiently clear that the Chief Justice gave his opinion after he
heard those of the Bar. Two other references stand under the
same year, 1313-1314. In one instance the reporter says:
"Dount dit fust par les seriauntz ct par les Justices que . . !,4

In the other: "Nota qe justices et scriaunt. tindrent pour cer.teyn ley qsl .
These opinions seem to have been given on all questions
that proved difficult for the judges to decide irrespectively of
their place in the system of law then administered. They
relate to the question of how a seisen is to be tiaced,O nature
of the writ of entry, 7 validity of an exemption to a warranty, s
when an assise of novel disseisen could be had. 9
The view that general professional opinion was an authority on the matters of law continued to be still in force in the
fifteenth century as evidenced by Littleton, J., in his "Tenures."
Sir Edward Coke says: "For the Common law his (Little-ton's) proofs and arguments are drawn from 20 several fountains or places:

.

.

. Ninthly---a communi opinione juris-

prudentum." 10 At least in two instances, Coke's opinion .is
confirmed by Littleton who founded his argument on the words
"Attecrouch v. Frost, (1310) Y. B. 3 Ed. II (S. S.) x6o.
'Anonymous, (1313-1314) Y. B. (S. S.), Eyre of Kent, Vol. 2, p.
93-

SStadeburys Case, (1313-1314) Y. B. (S. S.), Eyre of Kent, Vol. 2, p.
T72. It is worth noticing the order in which the reporter places seriaunta*

and justices. In the first quotation serjeants are placed foremost undoubtedly because their opinion was delivered prior to that of the judges. In the
second, which was only a reporter's note, the order is reversed probably
because of the greater respect that was due naturally enough for the
judges.
'Robert v. Jon, supra in Note 2.
Frost supra in Note 3.
'Attecrouch ;r.
aAnonymous, supra in Note 4.
'Stadebury's Case, supra in Note 5.
"Co. Litt. iHa.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

342

"It. is commonly said.""' In the sixteenth century we have Sir
Edward Coke's own observation upon Littleton: "'Also it is
commonly said, etc.' That is, it is the common opinion and
communis opinio is of good authority in law. A communi abservantia non est recedenduo, which appeareth here by Littleton." 12 And again: "it is commonly said, 'Here by the opinion of Littleton communis opido is of authoritie and stands with
the rule of law. Miniine mutanda sunt quae certain habuerunt
interpretationem." 13
We have no evidence during the seventeenth century, but in
the eighteenth it is significant that Blackstohe in his Chapter on
the Nature of Laws does not mention the universal opinion at
all. 14 And'by the end of that century we get a definite dictum
that the opinions of the Bar are of no avail against a definite judicial decision. Thus, per Keyon, M. R.: "And I thought the
question had been settled by the decisions. If it is of any weight
what the opinions of the Bar were, the case of Norris v. Ruthwaite was decided against those opinions." '5 Yet the doctrine
has not become dead, for early in the nineteenth century we
see Lord Mansfield enumerating for his duthorities equally with
books of authority and a decided case "the universally received opinion of the profession." In the same case Heath, J.,
simply said that such was the opinion "on this side of Westminster Hall." These expressiois, though not accompanied
by the word "authority" show that universal professional opinion in that case was considered as a decisive proof of what was
the law on the point in question. Given at length the dicta
appear so: Per Mansfield, C. J.: "Chief Baron Comyns and
all the books recognise Lord Coke's doctrine without a doubt.
Shakespear v. Peppin recognizes the authority of Fawcett v.
Strickland and that case throughout the whole argument takes
"Co.

Litt. i86a, 364b.

1Co. Litm i86a.
"Co. -itt. 364b.
"Black- Comm., Vol. 1 Sec. 2.
"Benyon v. Maddison,. (1786) 2 B. C. C. 73 at p. 77.
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it for granted that the law is so. The universally received opinion of the profession ever since I have been in the law has been
that there can be no approver against common of turbary." -Per
Heath, I.: "On this side of Westminster Hall the law has always been so received; and during the time I was at the bar, I
have given opinions to that effect." 16
Ten years later Chief Justice Dallas referred to the "general understanding of the profession" in terms though of respect yet shorn of the word "authority": "And although during this period there have been many general elections, yet it
never occurred to any .oneto raise the objection now before the
Court till this action was brought. I do not mean to say that
if the law be clear this circumstance would be 6f any avail; but
it serves to shew the general understanding of the profession
during so long a time; and, in general, the silence of Westminster Hall when considered with relation to questions of this importance has been considered as of some weight.' 17
As late as 1833 we find the echo of this doctrine when
Park, J., and Gurney, B., speaking in Garland v. Cailisle,18
said: "The same point has been so laid down in different textbooks, and I may say for myself,.that, since I became a member
of the profession, and in the habit of advising others, I have considered that no question of bankrupt law was more completely
settled than this; I never heard that any doubt was entertained
upon it; and I certainly felt some surprise when the objection
was taken on the first motion for a new trial in the case of
Baln e v. Hutton." This opinibn of Park, I., though not contradicted, was not followed. "The next question is. whether this
act of Parliament has in all times received a contrary exposition? If an act *of Parliament more than two centuries old has
received one uniform construction, it would, perhaps, be more
safe to yield to that construction (even though it should not be
quite satisfactory) than, by making a change, to unsettle the op"Grant v. Gunner, (i8og) I Taunt. 435, at p. 448.
" Thompson v. Pearce, (18ig) i Brod. & B. 25, at p. 33.
M2 Cromp. & M. 31, at pp. 39, 66.
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inions and the practice of the profession and of the public."
During the next year Park, B., recognized universal opinion as
a source of law: "If the former supposition be correct it is some
but not the most satisfactory evidence of the communis opfnio,
one of the sources from which we derive our knowledge of the
common law." '9 Gurney, B.'s, words are vitiated by reference
to "the practice of the profession'," a subject here not considered, and secondly the reference on the same level to "the opinions of the public" which were never of any weight in an AngloAmerican court. In the face of all these later cases we find it
difficult to maintain that the general opinion of the profession
is still of authority in the law of England and the United States
on all questions of that law. Tompkins, J., said in Marquerite
v. Chouteau:20 "It seems to be a wise rule to receive no lower
evidence of the law than the treatises of the learned sages of
the profession, or in the language of the civilians 'Responsa
Prudentum.'" We come to the conclusion that the direct reference to general opinion of the profession on all questions of
English law has become evidently disused.
But there is one branch of law, where the general opinion
of the profession still remains an authority and that is conveyancing. The universal opinion of the profession as evidenced by
the general practice of the conveyancers governs the decision of
an Anglo-American court in matters affecting the titles to real
and personal prioperty. 21 But "modem methods of conveyancing
22
are not to be construed to affect ancient notions of equity."
And similarly of law, of course. That it must be universal is
clear from the following passage of Hardwicke, L. C.: "There is
but one thing behind, which deserves to be taken notice of under
this head: It was said to have been the general rule amongst
conveyancers in making conveyances upon purchases. . .
"Gray v. Queen, (1844) 11 CL. & F. 42, at p. 46&
"3 Mo. 375, 387 (1 8 3).
' "What a howl would be set up (and not uhjustly) if the Courts were
to disregard the established practice of conveyancers." J. Austin. Juris. Lect.
XXXVIII, (3d ed.) p. 667.
'Senhouse v. Earle, (1755) Arb.285, at p. 28M

OPINIO PRUDENTUM IN ANGLO-AMERICAN

LAW

I have enquired of a very learned and eminent conveyancer, and
cannot find that there has been any such general rule. If there
had, I confess it would have been very material as in my Lady
Radnor's case. It is true that Mr. John Ward of the Temple,
who was considerable in that branch of business, has declared it
to be his opinion, and he took it to be so. But how far he practiced so, non constat; and if he did, it would not make a general
rule, which is the point to be inquired after. To reduce it to
reason, it must be taken with a distinction [explains the proper
use of both methods]. Such instances as these may account for
the practice in many cases, but cannot constitute a general
rule."

23

Four years later the same Lord Chancellor laid down the
rule that the opinion of conveyancers generally received ought to
govern: "The opinion of conveyancers in all times, and their constant course, is of great weight. They are to advise, and if their
opinion is not to prevail, must every case come to law? No; the
received opinion ought to govern." 24 In the same case Lord
Mansfield expressed a similar view and gave a reason for holding such opinion: 25 "Consider also the usage and transactions of
mankind upon it; the object of all laws, with regard to real property, is quiet and repose. As to practice, there has almost been
only one opinion. The greatest conveyancers; the whole profession of the law; Sir Orlando Bridgeman; Lord Nottingham.;
there was n6t a doubt at the bar in Harvey v. Ashley; Mr. Fazakerley always took it for granted that infants were bound." And
Wilnot, J., made it clear that practice is admitted as a proof of
opinion, while the generality of the latter shows its correctness: 26
"I prove the opinion of Conveyancers for two centuries by this
medium; it is now about two hundred years since the Statute of
H. VIII was made. The practice proves the opinion; and the
"Willoughby v. Willoughby, (1757) x Durn. & E. 763, at p. 77t.
Buckinghamshire v. Drury, (176i) 2 Eden 6o, at p. 64.

'S. c. at p. 74, approved in Meriamn v. Harsen, . (147) 2 Barb. C.
at p. 269, per Walworth, C.
21S. e. Wilmot's Notes 177, at p.

219.

23v,

346

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

uninterrupted acquiescence under the practice proves the rectitude of the opinion." 27
This doctrine received its full recognition just about a hundred years ago in the case of Smith v. Jersey. 28 The opinions
of Best, J., Lord Eldon and Lord Redesdale were most emphatic
in their recognition of it. We proceed to give them verbatim.
First is that of Best, J.:2' "My Lords, I have heard the learned
Judgei say that they would never allow a practice to be set aside
on which the titles to many estates depended, however much they
might disapprove of such a practice." The most open of them
was that of Lord Eldon: 30 "My Lords, we hear of the practice
of conveyancers, and that amounts to a very considerable authority; and I am justified in that assertion by the opinions of
the greatest men who have sat in Westminster Hall, who, I am
persuaded, in many instances, if matters had been res integra',
would have pronounced decisions very different from those
which they thought proper to adopt, if they had not taken notice
of the practice of conveyancers as authority." We conclude this
subject with a quotation from Lord Redesdale's judgment: "I
do conceive, that the law has frequently been decided, even in
the construction of acts of Parliament, upon what has been the
general understanding of lawyers as to the true intention of those
acts of Parliament: and I will instance such a case under the
Statute of Jointure. Your Lordships' House determined, in the
case of Drury v. Drury (3 B. P. C. 492), that a rent charge
settled on an infant was, within the Statute of Jointure (27 H.
"These opinions have been endorsed by Camden, L. C.: "Much property has been settled and conveyances have proceeded upon the ground of
that determination. In the case of Vardebendy in the House of Lords the
doctrine about dower prevailed because it had been practised in a course of
conveyance." Morecock v. Dickins, (768) Amb. 678, at p. 681. And they
are shared by Mr. Justice Buller: "Some things are extremely clear. In the
construction of agreements and covenants the intention of the parties is principally to be attended to. In conveyances of this sort the usage of the
profession also deserves considerable attention." Browning v. Wright, (1799)
2 Bos. & P. 13, at p. 26. See also Chafer & Randall's Contracts, (1916) 2
Ch. 8, at pp. i6 and 24.
(1821) 2 Brod. & B. 473.
S. c. at p. 5o7.

S.- c. at p. 599.
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8c. io), a good bar to dower; not because such was the literal
interpretation of the Statute, but because such had been the constant practice of conveyancers and others touching the subject;
and it was expressly upon that ground, that your Lordships' decision at that time went; and I do conceive it is of the utmost
importance that your Lordships should guide your judgment by
that criterion, whenever it can be applied; for, otherwise, mY
Lords, all property must be in hazard." And on the next page:
"And therefore, the practice of conveyancers upon subjects, of
this description is, I conceive, a most important qonsider-ation,
and, wherever that has prevailed for a great length of time
without impeachment in a Court of Justice, I take it, it ought
to be considered as a true exposition of the law." 31
The matter might have rested here as sufficiently clear and
supported by opinions of judges whose views are of such great
weight that it seems inappropriate to entertain even a shadow
of doubt that what they have laid down as law is such. Yet we
cannot pass without notice the opinion expressed upon the sub-.
ject now under consideration by Lord Gifford, M. R., in Purdew
v. Jackson. 2 The question there raised was the validity of the
husband's assignment of his wife's reversional interest in-a personal chattel-that is, a question of the validity of a title to aproperty. The view expressed with regard to the authority of
professional opinion as evidenced by the practice of conveyancers was as follows: "It was stated in argument from the bar
that the only decided case on the subject had not given satisfaction; that the voice of the profession was against it; that a.contrary notion had long and generally prevailed- and had been the
foundation of opinions on which the titles of such property
were founded; and that all those titles would be shaken if that
case were now to be confirmed. These latter observations must,
of course, be understood to apply to the state of authorities before the decision ift Hornsby v. Lee. . . . Great attention is
' 1 S. c. at p. 6xr. See also Rawson v. Johnson, (iSoi) i East 2o3, at
Candler v. Candler, (1821) Jacob 225, at p. 232; Howard v. Ducane, (823) 1 Turn. & R. 8z, at p. 86.
,
3(1824) x Russ. r, at p. 62 et seq.
p.

211;
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certainly due to the prevailing opinions of the profession on any
point. If, however, the point has never been settled by express
decision, it is the duty of the judge, before whom the question is
brought, to exercise his own unbiased judgment .upon it with all
the deference and caution which ought to be expected from him
before he relies upon his own opinion, when opposed to that of
the generality of the profession; but with a sense of the responsibility which his functions impose upon him of tracing the subject to the principles and analogous authorities and -of endeavouring to come to a correct conclusion. It is possible that
opinions may occasionally be afloat founded on loose expressions and scattered dicta, sometimes uttered without mature consideration, sometimes inaccurately or imperfectly reported, which
pass from one man to another and are gradually received and
acted upon as forming the law, without sufficient authority for
such a conclusion."
This taken as a whole, stands in direct and irreconcilable
contradiction to the doctrine we have laid down above. It flatly
refutes the opinion of Lords Mansfield, Hardwicke, Eldon and
Redesdale, not mentioning lesser legal lights. As far as we are
able to discern, it is not supported by later decisions. So long
as it contradicts the general doctrine with regard to the authority
of professional opinion evidenced by the general practice of conveyancers, we submit, this view of Lord Gifford is not law. But
as a decision it can be supported. Contrary to the.opinion of the
profession as pressed upon the Court there had been a previous
decision in Hornsby v. Lee. Lord Gifford, it is true, said that
he considered the matter independently of Hornsby v. Lee, but as
res integrw. Yet he (at the top of page 63) referred to it at
least as a warning to the profession in giving their advice and on
drawing conveyances. The chief reason for following the
general opinion of conveyancers is that a reversal of such opinions practiced for a considerable time would upset many titles
to the contrary. Now, a persistence in such opinions in the face
of a judicial decision to the contrary is merely a reckless obstinacy and those who practice it not only take the risk of doing so
at their peril, but also deserve a punishment. Lord Redesdale has

-
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also mentioned this qualification in Smnzith v. Jersey: "And whenever that practice of conveyancers has prevailed for a great length
of time without impeachment in a Court of Justice it ought to
be considered as a true exposition of law." 3But Lord Eldon evidently did not recognize this distinction
in Maundwell v. Maund-well 34 where he declared that: "I should
with much more reluctance at this day have sent to Law to be
reconsidered the question whether such a power could be reserved to the owner of the fee knowing the practice and seeing
what is in the books; though feeling great respect for the op.inion of the Court of Common Pleas diminished only by former
authorities. . . . Perhaps I should if it had been asked have
permitted it, though contrary to my opinion; which I now declare."
On the whole, we are inclined to accept the qualification as
hinted at by Lord Redesdale and as applied by Lord Gifford in
Purdcw z.Jackson. 3 The opinion of conveyancers is accepted
as a best exposition of law when it is universal and has been
acted upon by the whole of the profession for a length of time.
The time and universality show that there is no reason to impeach it, no sufficient foundation to set it aside. All this cannot
be affirmed when we come face to face with the fact that the
Court held on the similar point within this period of time a
contrary opinion. It is impossible that the profession as a whole
would disregard that decision-the practice then could hardly be
said to be universal. The length of time can be taken only pp
to that decision; after it lapse of time is of no avail. On these
grounds we think that the limitation must be upheld.
LEGAL ACADEMIC OPINION.

Such legal academic opinion as expressed in lectures only
will be considered here. The opinion of readers and professors
of the Anglo-American Law as expressed in books is considered
=(x821) z Brod & B. 4 73.
(x8o4) to Ves. 246, at p.
5
Supra in Note 3z

266.
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without a special reference to them under the works on lawcommon or otherwise as the case may be.
Sir Edward Coke in the early part of his "Commentary on
Littleton," says this:
"For the common law his [Littleton's] proofs and arguments are drawn from 20 several foundations or places:
(w) A lectionibus jurisprudcntiun.'"36 In the body of the work
he discusses the matter somewhat more fully, thus: "leo aye
sovent la lecture de l'estatite de Westminister second." 37 "Here
it is to be observed of what authoritie antient lectures or readings upon Statutes were, for that they had five excellent qualities.
First, they declared what the common law was before the making of the statute as here it appeareth. Secondly, they opened
the true sense and meaning of the Statute. Thirdly, their cdses
were briefe, having at the most one point at the common law,
and another upon the Statute. Fourthly, plain and perspicuous
for then the honour of the reader was to excell others in authorities, arguments and reasons for proofs of his opinion, and
for confutation of the objections against it. Fifthly, they read, to
suppresse subtill inventions to creepe out of the Statute. But now
readings having lost the said former qualities, have lost also their
former authorities; for now the cases are long, obscure and intricate full of new conceits, liken rather to riddles than lectures,
which when they are opened they vanish away like smoke and
the readers are like lapwings who seem to be nearest their nests
when they are farthest from them, and all their study is to find
nice evasions out of Statute. By the authority of Littleton antient readings may be cited for proofs of the law but new readings have not that honour for that they are so obscure and
dark." 8
Several questions arise for consideration. Sir Edward Coke
no doubt referred only to the lectures read in the Inns of Court
-but we may safely extend his opinion to cover the lectures
:'Co. Litt. iia.
"Litt. Sec. 48r.
'4 Co. Litt. 28b.
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read academically in other high juridical teaching institutions of
England and America, for nowhere else such lectures had. been
read at the time of Sir Edward Coke. It was not until 1758
that Sir William Blackstone, as lie afterwards became, commenced his famuous course of lectures on the law of England at
Oxford-lectures, that have become an authority in the AngloAmerican law.
Again, it my be said that Sir Edward Coke referred only
to a particular kind of lecture-those on the statutes. Here also
we need not labour long, for the matter is merely of form
and not of substance. Coke himself says that they started with
exposition of common law prior to the statute and one of the
points in a case given was on common law, the other on the
statute. In fact, the statute was only a skeleton to weave the
common law around-the latter supplied the necessary flesh.
But far more important consideration should be given to
the question as to what period Coke referred to when he said that
"ancient reading may be cited for law, but new readings have
not that honour." When did the period of these ancient readings
end and that of the modern commence?
We would suggest the middle of the fifteenth century as the
end of this period for Coke's comment concerns the word of
Littleton: "Jeo aye oye sozent" (I have often heard). Now,
Littleton relied on the lectures as authority and evidently they
were so considered in his time. Sir Thomas Littleton's activities were confined to Henry VI's time (421-1471) and he most
likely heard these lectures in the earlier part of his life. Consequently up to the middle of the fifteenth century all lectures
would be of authority in law per se, afterwards only those that
would be adjudged by the Courts as such. The result need not
astound an imaginative reader who might think that a new
wealth of authority would be thus bestowed on English and
American lawyers. We do not know whether, when Sir Edward Coke wrote, the position was the same as now, but so
far as we are concerned, besides Sir Thomas Littleton's own lec-
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tures Wwe do not know of any others extant. R. R. Pearce, in
his Guide to the Inns of Court mentions on pages 65-69 famous
readings, hut the earliest of them are of Littleton. Pearce published his book in 1855. We cannot find a reference anywhere
to any other lecturer prior to Littleton whose lectures would be
of authority independently of the rule we are now discussing. So
that Coke's affirmation of authority of ancient readings probably, even in his own time, was merely a theoretical proposition.
Lectures or readings delivered in modem times would not
be of authority per sc. Lectures of Coke, Staundforde, Sir
Francis Bacon would be of authority because of the personal authority enjoyed by their authors. On the other hand, we find
the lectures of Sir Robert Brook, who was a reader of the Middle Temple tenipore Edward VI (537-1553), disallowed by
Burrough, J., who said: "But I object to Brook's readings, as
authority. They were no more than lectures." 40 Now, if this
learned judge thought, following Sir Edward Coke, that no lectures could become an authority after the period mentioned by the
latter, we submit he was laying down something that certainly is
not law. Callis's lectures and those of Blackstone are standing
refutations. Again, if he thought that lectures as such should
never be allowed as authority, we should like to know on what
grounds then can be supported such occasional notes as marginal
observations.4" It can hardly be argued with plausibility that a
lecturer bestows less care upon his lectures than a practitioner
upon the marginal notes. Burrough, L, may have thought the
work too elementary. But equal objection would apply to Callis's and Blackstone's works. It is not an objection affecting
the authority of a work, but rather limiting the extent of such
authority. Moreover, we find great difficulty in maintaining the
proposition that a work cannot be an authority because it is
popular or elementary when popular exposition of the law of
"Harl. M. S. S. i691 if. 188 and following.
'Tolson v. Kaye, (1822) 3 Brod. & B. 217, at p. 226.
" R. v. Millis, (1844) 1o Cl. & F. 534.
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Marriage, attributed (but not with certainty) to Dodderidge, J.,
is referred to by no less a reverent judge than Lyndhurst, L. C.,
as "a learned work" and "authority." 42 It is also impossible
to say that Burrough, J., has simply said that Brook's readings
are of no authority; he went further, -continuing, as a reason
for his objection: "They were no more than lectures." We submit that this reason is not a valid one. We further submit that
what he said with regard to these readings is not law and unless
later dicta will declare them to be of no authority on some other
grounds, proper lectures should be deemed to be authoritative.
Lectures of Sir Edward Littleton (1589-i645), afterwards Lord
Littleton and Keeper of the Seal to Charles I, -or part of them,
are reported in Salkeld's Reports at page 4; as cited by Barker,
C. B., in 1744. 4a Whether as authority or illustration we do
not know, but no word "authority" was applied to them. We.
are inclined to think that probably this portion has been quoted
as an Illustration of professional opinion of the period.
But one reading, at least, we know for certain has become
an authority that cannot be classed under any of the above .heads
-that is Robert Callis's Readings on the Statutes of Sewers. He
had been a Commissioner of Sewers for his native county, a serjeant at law, and, according to Pearce, read his lectures at the
Gray's Inn in 1622. His ring bore an appropriate inscription:
"Regis oracula leges." 44 Buller, I., referring to his lectures,
said: "It (sewer) is common and public in its nature; it -is
so
considered in Callis's Readings, one of the best performmanes on
that subject, and which has always been admitted as good
authority." 4
INDIVIDUAL PROFESSIONAL OPINION.

Individual opinion written or expressed by a member of
the bar not possessing personal authority has no authority in the
Anglo-American law. Written opinion when the author is "no
"S. C. at p. 848.
' Omychund v. Barker, i Atk. 21, at p. 42.

"Cro. Car. 71.
'Dore v. Gray, (1788) 2 Durn. & E. 3s8, at p. 365.
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more" may be cited in a court in the manner in which the Works
of no authority are cited. For example, in Forth v. Norfolk,4
an opinion of ancient Serjeant George Hill was cited, but.this
47
serjeant died as long ago as i8o8.
The opinions of individual members of the profession can
come before the Court in four different manners: (i) as expressed in a book; (2) as a written view upon some question;
(3)as an argument at the Bar; (4) as a deposition describing
foreign law or judicial practice.
With an opinion expressed in a book or other written work
and made public we have already dealt."' The only individual
legal opinion that will be dealt with here will be that of. the members of the Bar qua such members. The weight possessed in
the Anglo-American law by the opinions given even by the
eminent jurists when at the Bar was estimated per Buller, .,
thus: "Much was there 49 said of opinions given by eminent men
at the Bar. Such opinions, however well considered, have no
weight in the scale of justice." 50 The opinion there cited appears to have been given by Lord Mansfield.
The first instance when we meet with the question is the
opinion of Lord Holt expressed in Coggs v. -Bernard: 1
"The case of 9 Ed. 4, 4ob, was but a debate at bar.- For
Danby was but a counsel then, though he had been a Chief Justice in the beginning of Ed. 4, yet he was removed and restored
again upon the restitution of Hen. 6, as appears by DPugdale's
Chronica Series. So that what he said cannot be taken to be
any authority, for he spoke for his client; and Genney for his
client said the contrary." In the beginning of the eighteenth
(1820) 4 Madd. 5o3. See also "The Santa Cruz," (798) 1 C. Rob. 42.
at p. S3.
" Woolrych's Lives of Eminent Serjeants, p. i8o.
'We might add here that the legal academic opinion cannot come
before the Court in any other form than a written work or lecture, notes
taken by some student; under these heads it would fall into the line of general discussion as to the books of no authority or the lectures. These two
subjects were discussed by us supra.
'Perrin v. Blake, (17"o) 4 Burr. 2579; 1 Blackt. 672.
"Hodgson v. Ambrose, (i780) i Dougl. 336, at p. 341.
" (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, at p. 9t4.

OPINJO PRUDENTUM IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

century the same opinion was again expressed by Cowper, L. C.:
"But in answer to this I observe that this point was not adjudged
in Shelley's case; it is only the argument of counsel which the
Court in delivering their opinion took no notice of." 5. Chief
Justice Best about a hundred years after used substantially the
same language: "Undoubtedly that is the law; it is the grant of
several persons; though what Plowden says is no authority; nor
is it in this case the opinion of any Judges, but it is only the
argument of Serjt. Catline." 5
The doctrine has taken such strong root in the law of England that we hardly need to multiply authorities. It has never
been, so far as we know, directly contradicted by any judge.
One of the latest recognitions of it is that of Lord Justice Fry:
"But the passage we have cited appears to have no real weight
of authority. It is only part of the argument of the Attorney
General." 54 Yet Macdonald, C. B., at about the same time
used some dubious language with regard to an opinion expressed
by an attorney general when arguing a case. He said: "That
proposition having slept from Gerard's tinpe to this, we find no
adoption of it in any text-book; we find the question raised
whether the terre-tenants could be brought in, which was precisely the point in that case; but in no text-book has the great
and extensive proposition of Gerard been adopted in words or
in substance; although if that proposition had been understood in
Westminster Hall to be law, we should so have had it. The
authority, to be sure, is a respectable one, but it is the authority
of a person arguing for the crown, and it is reasonable to infer
that Gerard stated this proposition greatly beyond what was assented to by the Court in the case referred to." " We submit
that the expression "the authority to be sure is a respectable one"
is not law, for an expression at the bar by a counsel cannot be
of any authority. This expression must be taken in the light of
the following words, "but it is the authority of a person arguing
"Brown v. Barkham. (17r6) x Stra. 35, at p. 3&
"Garland v. Genkyll, (i24) 2 Bing. 273, at p. '299.
25 Q. B. D. 57, at p. 70.
"R. v. Smith, (i8io) Wight W. 34, at p. 49.

" Cochrane v. Moore, (189o)
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for the crown"; we know already that such authority is entitled
to no weight at all. Very likely Macdonald, C. B., was led to
use this language because Sir Gilbert Gerard had subsequently
been Master of the Rolls, but the opinion of Lord Holt given
above shows that even such a fact cannot and does not in any
way influence the general doctrine.
What might appear at the first sight an exception to the
doctrine is that the arguments of the counsel as reported by
Croke, J., and Sir Edward Coke and a few others, are regarded
as of authority. But the reason of this attitude is explained by
Richards, C. B.: "In Cro. Eliz., pp. 511, 512, we find a very
material case (Wright v. Wright). Sir Edward Coke at that
time, it is true, was only counsel; but we know that the author
of these reports, as does Lord Coke himself in his own reports,
states the arguments if they are not contradicted as having been
considered to be founded upon the law of the land and therefore
sanctioned by the Court." " So that it is not the arguments of
the counsel that are allowed as authority, but owing to the peculiar manner which the reporter has adopted in taking down a
case, part of the judgments is put in the mouth o.f the counsel
at the bar. Therefore we do not get a complete opinion of the
court without embodying the reported speeches of the counsel.
Finally we come to consider the opinions of individual members of the bar when given to the court in order to explain foreign law or judicial practice: But lest there be a msunderstanding we must make it clear that we are not considering here the depositions made as to what foreign law
is when such question arises in an English or American court.
X'e have limited this paper tor a consideration of the works
and opinions of jurists from a point of view of their
ability of either directly being a source of English law,
e. g., shaping it by means of works and opinions of authority,
or at least of influencing in however a small degree its formation by means of works or opinions of no authority. Under
Att. Gen. v. Eardley. (182o) 8 Price 39, at p. 59. See also Fisher v.
i Ld. Raym. 622, at p. 631, and Strader v. Heirs of Byrd,
(1835) 7 Oh. 184, at p. 187.
W\iggs, (i7oo)
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none of these two broad divisions will fall the opinion of jurists
as to what the foreign law is. Such opinions are mere evidence
tendered to prove a fact-the foreign law. Certainly, as 4 fact
upon which a judge bases his opinion, a jurist's evidence influ-

ences the result of the judge's decision. But it, as any other fact,
influences the material result of that decision and not the
legal. "a But there is a branch of English law which in some
degree depends on and is influenced directly by the individual
professional opinion, especially when a question not settled or
still more probably not even mooted out by English lawyers,
arises in a court of law. Lord Mansfield, in tlte case of Triquet
v. Bath,5 7 said: "I remeiber in a case before Lord Talbot, of
Barbut.
Buvo z,.

.

.

.

Lord Talbot declared a clear opinion,

'That the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of the law
of England. That the law of nations was to be collected from
the practice of different nations and the authority of writers.'
I was counfsel in this case, and have a full note of it."

"The first crime in the indictment is an infraction of the law of
nations. This law in its full extent is part of the law of this
state and is to be collected from the practice of different nations
and the authority of writers." 8 In the same year Lord Mansfield had taken an opportunity to apply the principle here enunciated, namely, that the rules of international law are to be colBetlected from the practice of foreign nations. In Ricord z,.
bill
ransom
of
a
payment
terham 59 a question arose concerning a
given to an alien enemy, though the hostage given to that .enemy
died in prison. Blackstone, counsel for the defendant, offered
to make inquiry into the practice of Holland and France; to
which Lord Mansfield answered: "Let it therefore stand ever
",Such evidence does not and cannot form a rule binding" upon another
judge who may act upon another jurist's evidence probably deposing differently upon the same point. This kind of a deposition cannot influence any
legal principle of law that a judge in England or America would apply to
solve a problem composed by facts amongst which one shall be the law of a
foreign country.
" (1764) 3 Burr. 1478, at p. 1481.
'R. v. De Longchamps, (1784) 1 Dallas ii, at p. i6, .per M'Kean,

C. I.

S(1764) 1 W. & Black. 563, at p. 568.
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upon the single point of that inquiry." At the next term Blackstone acquainted the court with opinions of Meerman, of Rotterdam, and his colleagues communicated by the former and De
Beamnont of Paris, who gave a similar opinion and said that a
few years before such a case was decided in accord with his
opinion in the Parliament of Normandy. Judgment went as
suggested by these opinions. This illustration is given rather
fully for it shows well that it is not the foreign practice as such
that is taken into account but the opinion of foreign lawyers as
to what that practice is or even would be, as in the case of the
jurists above. The use of individual professional opinion, we
may expect, must be similar to that of the works of law possessing no authority. And so it is. But, certainly, the use made
by the judges of individual opinion of the Bar is more limited
than that of written works. The limitation lies in the nature of
the opinion. It cannot be, for one thing, a register or a compilation of authorities; when it is written it is customary to add
only the most important authorities, and it is usually drawn in
a short and concise form. Such opinion also cannot serve as
an indication of how the profession regards certain decisions of
a court-when expressed privately in what is technically known
as "an opinion" it is a reflection of an individual's view, likely
to be prejudiced by the interests of the client whose case the
counsel is considering. When stated at the bar argiendo it is
not only coloured by such interest, but also authoritatively either
disposed of as irrelevant or allowed, and then will be in future
referred to as an opinion of the court and not as that of counsel.
Apart from these two uses we find that individual legal
opinions are used similarly to that of works of no authority.
Thus, as a correct statement of several judicial decisions: "And
though the passages cited from Bridgman '0 appear only to have
been said by him in the argument of that case, it is well known
that Bridgman was a counsel of considerable eminence and what
he said seems warranted by other decisions." 61 Again, such
"Samborne v. Itarilo, (z6zi)

J. Bridg. 9.

"Sadgrove v. Kirby, (r7oS) 6 Durn. & M. 483, at p. 486, per Kenyon,
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opinions may be used as a correct statement of a judge's views
upon some doctrine of law and the arguments that support it.
To such use, for example, an opinion of an anonymous counsel
was put by Hardwicke, C. J.: "And therefore the argument made
use of in the case of Matthews and Burdet, 2 Salk. 673, though
it be only the reasoning of counsel, is of great weight and such
as I have heard io satisfactory answer given to." 02 Furthermore, such opinion can be anti is used as a correct statement of
law. Thus Lord Kenyon, C. J., after reading the "reasons"
stated hy the counsel'in support of his written case on appeal to
the Privy Council in Morris 7,. Iard, said: " Though the above
were only the reasons of the Counsel in that case, they contain
as nmch good sense and sound law as if they had had the
authority of all the judges of England." 03
Finally, they may be used as showing the contemporary
view of the profession on some legal rule or practice. Per Sir
W. Scott: "In the discussion of the case much attention was
paid to an opinion found amongst the manuscript collections of
a very experienced practitioner in this profession (Sir E. Simson), which records the practice and the rule as it was understood to prevail in his time." 04
Borris M. Komar.
New York City.
CMiddleton

v. Crofts, (1736) 2 Atk. 65o, at p. 685.

'Alpass v. Watkins, (i8oo) 8 Durn. & E. 516, at p. 519.
""The Santa Cruz," (r798) i C. Rob. 42, at p. 53.

